My involvement with Vietnam ended the day after I left the East Room. The war, of course, went on for another seven years. By the time the United States finally left South Vietnam in 1973, we had lost over 58,000 men and women; our economy had been damaged by years of heavy and improperly financed war spending; and the political unity of our society had been shattered, not to be restored for decades.

Were such high costs justified?

Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, Lee Kwan Yew, and many other geopoliticians across the globe to this day answer yes. They conclude that without U.S. intervention in Vietnam, Communist hegemony—both Soviet and Chinese—would have spread farther through South and East Asia to include control of Indonesia, Thailand, and possibly India. Some would go further and say that the USSR would have been led to take greater risks to extend its influence elsewhere in the world, particularly in the Middle East, where it might well have sought control of the oil-producing nations. They might be correct, but I seriously question such judgments.
When the archives of the former Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam are opened to scholars, we will know more about those countries’ intentions, but even without such knowledge we know that the danger of Communist aggression during the four decades of the Cold War was real and substantial. Although during the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s the West often misperceived, and therefore exaggerated, the power of the East and its ability to project that power, to have failed to defend ourselves against the threat would have been foolhardy and irresponsible.

That said, today I question whether either Soviet or Chinese behavior and influence in the 1970s and 1980s would have been materially different had the United States not entered the war in Indochina or had we withdrawn from Vietnam in the early or mid-1960s. By then it should have become apparent that the two conditions underlying President Kennedy’s decision to send military advisers to South Vietnam were not being met and, indeed, could not be met: political stability did not exist and was unlikely ever to be achieved; and the South Vietnamese, even with our training assistance and logistical support, were incapable of defending themselves.

Given these facts—and they are facts—I believe we could and should have withdrawn from South Vietnam either in late 1963 amid the turmoil following Diem’s assassination or in late 1964 or early 1965 in the face of increasing political and military weakness in South Vietnam. And, as the table opposite suggests, there were at least three other occasions when withdrawal could have been justified.

I do not believe that U.S. withdrawal at any of these junctures, if properly explained to the American people and to the world, would have led West Europeans to question our support for NATO and, through it, our guarantee of their security. Nor do I believe that Japan would have viewed our security treaties as any less credible. On the contrary, it is possible we would have improved our credibility by withdrawing from Vietnam and saving our strength for more defensible stands elsewhere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE OF WITHDRAWAL</th>
<th>U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN SOUTH VIETNAM</th>
<th>U.S KILLED IN ACTION</th>
<th>BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1963</td>
<td>16,300 advisers</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Collapse of Diem regime and lack of political stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1964 or early 1965</td>
<td>23,300 advisers</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>Clear indication of South Vietnam’s inability to defend itself, even with U.S. training and logistical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1965</td>
<td>81,400 troops</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>Further evidence of the above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1965</td>
<td>184,300 troops</td>
<td>1,594</td>
<td>Evidence that U.S. military tactics and training were inappropriate for the guerrilla war being waged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1967</td>
<td>485,600 troops</td>
<td>15,979</td>
<td>CIA reports indicating bombing in the North would not force North Vietnam to desist in the face of our inability to turn back enemy forces in South Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This and all subsequent figures in the table have been supplied by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.

*As of December 31, 1968, the number of U.S. killed-in-action in Vietnam totaled 30,568.

It is sometimes said that the post–Cold War world will be so different from the world of the past that the lessons of Vietnam will be inapplicable or of no relevance to the twenty-first century. I disagree. That said, if we are to learn from our experience in Vietnam, we must first pinpoint our failures. There were eleven major causes for our disaster in Vietnam:

1. We misjudged then—as we have since—the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries (in this case, North Vietnam and the Vietcong, supported by China and the Soviet Union), and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. We saw in them a thirst for—and a determination to fight for—freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.

3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people (in this case, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong) to fight and die for their beliefs and values—and we continue to do so today in many parts of the world.

4. Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders. We might have made similar misjudgments regarding the Soviets during our frequent confrontations—over Berlin, Cuba, the Middle East, for example—had we not had the advice of Tommy Thompson, Chip Bohlen, and George Kennan. These senior diplomats had spent decades studying the Soviet Union, its people and its leaders, why they behaved as they did, and how they would react to our actions. Their advice proved invaluable in shaping our judgments and decision. No Southeast Asian counterparts existed for senior officials to consult when making decisions on Vietnam.

5. We failed then—as we have since—to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people’s movements. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds of people from a totally different culture.

6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia before we initiated the action.

7. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did. We had not prepared the public to understand the complex events we faced and how to react constructively to the need for changes in course as the nation confronted uncharted seas and an alien environment. A nation’s deepest strength lies not in its military prowess but, rather, in the unity of its people. We failed to maintain it.

8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Where our own security is not directly at stake, our judgment of what is in another people’s or country’s best interest should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.

9. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action—other than in response to direct threats to our own security—should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.

10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions. For one whose life has been dedicated to the belief and practice of problem solving, this is particularly hard to admit. But, at times, we may have to live with an imperfect, un tidy world.

11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues, involving the great risks and costs—including, above all else, loss of life—associated with the application of military force under substantial constraints over a long period of time. Such organizational weakness would have been costly had this been the only task confronting the president and his advisers. It, of course, was not. It coexisted with the wide array of other domestic and international problems confronting us. We thus failed to analyze and debate our actions in Southeast Asia—our objectives, the risks and costs of alternative ways of dealing with them, and the necessity of changing course when failure was clear—with the intensity and thoroughness that characterized the debates of the Executive Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

These were our major failures, in their essence. Though set forth separately, they are all in some way linked: failure in one area con-
tributed to or compounded failure in another. Each became a turn in a terrible knot.

Pointing out these mistakes allows us to map the lessons of Vietnam, and places us in a position to apply them to the post–Cold War world.

Although clear evidence has existed since the mid-1980s that the Cold War was ending, nations throughout the world have been slow to revise their foreign and defense policies in part because they do not see clearly what lies ahead.

As the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, and the turmoil in Chechnya, Somalia, Haiti, Sudan, Burundi, Armenia, and Tajikistan make clear, the world of the future will not be without conflict, between disparate groups within nations and extending across national borders. Racial, religious, and ethnic tensions will remain. Nationalism will be a powerful force across the globe. Political revolutions will erupt as societies advance. Historic disputes over political boundaries will endure. And economic disparities among nations will increase as technology and education spread unevenly around the world. The underlying causes of Third World conflict that existed long before the Cold War began remain now that it has ended. They will be compounded by potential strife among states of the former Soviet Union and by continuing tensions in the Middle East. It is such tensions that in the past forty-five years have contributed to 125 wars causing 40 million deaths in the Third World.¹

In these respects, the world of the future will not be different from the world of the past—conflicts within and among nations will not disappear. But relations between nations will change dramatically. In the postwar years, the United States had the power—and to a considerable degree exercised that power—to shape the world as we chose. In the next century, that will not be possible.

Japan is destined to play a larger and larger role on the world scene, exercising greater economic and political power and, one hopes, assuming greater economic and political responsibility. The same can be said of Western Europe, which in 1993 took a major step toward economic integration. Greater political unity is bound to follow (despite opposition to the Maastricht Treaty), and it will strengthen Europe’s power in world politics.

And by the middle of the next century, several of the countries of what in the past we have termed the Third World will have grown so dramatically in population and economic power as to become major forces in international relations. India is likely to have a population of 1.6 billion; Nigeria, 400 million; Brazil, 300 million. If China achieves its ambitious economic goals for the year 2000, and maintains satisfactory but not spectacular growth rates for the next fifty years, its 1.6 billion people will have the income—the affluence—of Western Europeans in the mid-twentieth century. Its total gross domestic product will exceed that of the United States, Western Europe, Japan, or Russia. It will indeed be a power to be reckoned with. These figures are highly speculative, of course, but I cite them to emphasize the magnitude of the changes that lie ahead.

While remaining the world’s strongest nation, the United States will live in a multipolar world, and its foreign policy and defense programs must be adjusted to this emerging reality. In such a world, a need clearly exists for developing new relationships both among the Great Powers—of which there will be at least five: China, Europe, Japan, Russia, and the United States—and between the Great Powers and other nations.

Many political theorists—in particular, those classified as “realists”—predict a return to traditional power politics. They argue that the disappearance of ideological competition between East and West will trigger a reversion to traditional relationships based on territorial and economic imperatives: that the United States, Russia, Western Europe, China, Japan, and India will seek to assert themselves in their own regions while still competing for dominance in other areas of the world where conditions are fluid. This view has been expressed, for example, by Harvard Professor Michael Sandel: “The end of the Cold War does not mean an end of global competition between the Superpowers. Once the ideological dimension fades, what you are left with is not peace and harmony, but old-
fashioned global politics based on dominant powers competing for influence and pursuing their internal interests.”

Henry Kissinger, also a member of the realist school, has expressed a similar conclusion:

Victory in the Cold War has propelled America into a world which bears many similarities to the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. . . . The absence of both an overriding ideological or strategic threat frees nations to pursue foreign policies based increasingly on their immediate national interest. In an international system characterized by perhaps five or six major powers and a multiplicity of smaller states, order will have to emerge much as it did in past centuries from a reconciliation and balancing of competing national interests.

Kissinger’s and Sandel's conceptions of relations among nations in the post–Cold War world are historically well founded, but I would argue that they are inconsistent with our increasingly interdependent world. No nation, not even the United States, can stand alone in a world in which nations are inextricably entwined with one another economically, environmentally, and with regard to security. The United Nations charter offers a far more appropriate framework for international relations in such a world than does the doctrine of power politics.

I am not alone in this view. Carl Kaysen, former director of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, has argued: “The international system that relies on the national use of military force as the ultimate guarantor of security, and the threat of its use as the basis of order, is not the only possible one. To seek a different system [based on collective security] . . . is no longer the pursuit of an illusion, but a necessary effort toward a necessary goal.”

And George F. Kennan, at a celebration in honor of his ninetieth birthday held at the Council on Foreign Relations on February 15, 1994, observed that for the first time in centuries, no prospective Great Power conflicts threaten the peace of the world. It is this peace among the Great Powers—at least for the near term—that makes it truly possible both to pursue my vision of the post–Cold War world and, at the same time, to hedge against failure by maintaining the capacity to protect ourselves and our interests should the world experience a return to Great Power rivalry.

Maintaining that capacity does not mean that defense spending should remain at its current exorbitant level. In the United States, for example, defense expenditures during fiscal year 1993 totaled $291 billion—25 percent more in inflation-adjusted dollars than in 1980. Moreover, President Clinton’s five-year defense program for fiscal years 1995–1999 projects only a very gradual decline in expenditures from 1993 levels. Defense outlays in 1999, in inflation-adjusted dollars, are estimated to be only 3 percent less than under President Nixon, in the midst of the Cold War. The United States spends almost as much for national security as the rest of the world combined.

Such a defense program is not consistent with my view of the post–Cold War world—or the financing of domestic programs equally vital for our security. It assumes that in conflicts outside the NATO area—for instance, in Iraq, Iran, or the Korean peninsula—we will act unilaterally and without military support from other Great Powers. And it assumes that we must be prepared to undertake two such confrontations simultaneously. These are assumptions I find debatable at best.

Before nations can respond in an optimum manner to the end of the Cold War, they need a vision—a conceptual framework—of a world that would not be dominated by the East-West rivalry that shaped foreign and defense programs across the globe for more than forty years. In that new world, I believe relationships among nations should be directed toward five goals: They should

1. Provide all states guarantees against external aggression—frontiers should not be changed by force
2. Codify the rights of minorities and ethnic groups within states—the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, for instance—and provide them a means to redress their grievances without resort to violence
3. Establish a mechanism for resolving regional conflicts and conflicts within nations without unilateral action by the Great Powers
4. Increase the flow of technical and financial assistance to developing nations to help them accelerate their rates of social and economic advance
5. Assure preservation of the global environment as a basis of sustainable development for all

In sum, we should strive to create a world in which relations among nations would be based on the rule of law, a world in which national security would be supported by a system of collective security. The conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping functions necessary to accomplish these objectives would be performed by multilateral institutions, a reorganized and strengthened United Nations together with new and expanded regional organizations.

That is my vision of the post–Cold War world.*

Such a vision is easier to articulate than to achieve. The goal is clear, how to get there is not. I have no magic formula, no simple road map to success. I do know that such a vision will not be achieved in a month, a year, or even a decade. It will be achieved slowly and through small steps, by leaders of dedication and persistence. So I urge that we move now in that direction.

The post–Cold War world, seeking to deal with the conflicts that will inevitably arise within and among nations, while minimizing the risk of the use of military force and holding casualties resulting from its application to the lowest possible level, will need leaders. The leadership role may shift among nations depending on the issue at hand. Often, it will be filled by the United States. But in a system of collective security, the United States must accept collective decision making—and that will be very difficult for us. Correspondingly, if the system is to survive, other nations (in particular Germany and Japan) must accept a sharing of risks and costs—the political risks, the financial costs, and the risk of casualties and bloodshed—and that will be very difficult for them.

Had the United States and other major powers made clear their commitment to such a system of collective security, and had they stated they would protect nations against attack, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait might well have been deterred. Similarly, had the United Nations or NATO taken action when conflict in the former Yugoslavia erupted in the early 1990s, the ensuing slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent victims might have been prevented. But today I fear Bosnia falls in the category of problems for which there is no recognizable solution—or at least no military solution.

In the post–Cold War world, the United States should be clear about where, and how, it would apply military force. This requires a precise statement of U.S. foreign policy objectives. For forty years our objective remained clear: to contain an expansionist Soviet Union. But that can no longer be the focus of our efforts; we have lost our enemy. What will we put in its place? President Clinton told the U.N. General Assembly on September 27, 1993, “Our overriding purpose must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies.” Anthony Lake, the national security adviser, echoed this when, during the same week, he stated that “the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”* Such a general formulation of our objectives is not sufficient.

The United States clearly cannot and should not intervene in every conflict arising from a nation’s attempt to move toward capitalist democracy—for example, we were surely correct not to support with military force Eduard Shevardnadze’s attempt to install democracy in Georgia. Nor can we be expected to try to stop by military force every instance of the slaughter of innocent civilians. More than a dozen wars currently rage throughout the world: in Bosnia, Burundi, Georgia, Iraq, Kashmir, Rwanda, Sudan, and Yemen to name only a few. And serious conflicts may soon break

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out in Kosovo, Lesotho, Macedonia, and Zaire. Where, if at all, should we be involved? Neither the United States nor any other Great Power has a clear answer to that question. The answers can be developed only through intense debate, over a period of years, within our own nation, among the Great Powers, and in the councils of international organizations.

We must establish well-defined criteria for the use of military force by our own and other nations. The rules governing response to aggression across national borders can be relatively simple and clear. But those relating to attempts to maintain or restore political order and to prevent wholesale slaughter within nations—as, for instance, within Rwanda in 1994—are far less so.

Several crucial questions must be faced: To what degree of human suffering should we respond? Under a U.N. convention, formalized in a global treaty that became our national law in 1989, the United States agreed to join in stopping genocide. But what constitutes genocide? In June 1994, the U.S. government, while recognizing the killing of over 200,000 Rwandans as “acts of genocide,” refused to state that the killing fell under the treaty’s provisions. And would there not be other cases, short of genocide, that would also justify intervention? At what point should we intervene—as preventive diplomacy fails and killing appears likely, or only when the slaughter is increasing? How should we respond when nations involved in such conflicts—as was the case in the former Yugoslavia—claim that outside intervention clearly infringes on their sovereignty? We have seen the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States time and time again fail to support such intervention.

Above all else, the criteria governing intervention should recognize that, as we learned in Vietnam, military force has only a limited capacity to facilitate the process of nation building. Military force, by itself, cannot rebuild a “failed state.”

It should be made clear to the American people that such questions will, at best, require years to answer. But we should force the debate within our own nation and within international forums.

Some of the issues may never be resolved; there may be times when we must recognize that we cannot right all wrongs. Our judgments about the appropriateness of using force to maintain order in such an imperfect world cannot be certain. They must be checked, therefore, against the willingness of other nations with comparable interests to join in the decision, to assist in its implementation, and to share in its costs—another lesson of Vietnam.

At times U.S. military intervention will be justified not on humanitarian or peacekeeping grounds but on the basis of national security. Clearly, if a direct threat to this nation emerges, we should and will act unilaterally—after appropriate consultation with Congress and the American people. If the threat is less direct but still potentially serious—for example, strife in Kosovo or Macedonia that could trigger a larger Balkan conflict involving Greece, Turkey, and perhaps Italy—how should we respond? I strongly urge that we act only in a multilateral decision-making and burden-sharing context—another lesson of Vietnam.

The wars we fight in the post–Cold War world are likely more often than not to be “limited wars,” like Vietnam. General Westmoreland made a comment about Vietnam at an LBJ Library Conference in March 1991 that is relevant here. Referring to the constraints that kept the Vietnam War “limited,” he said: “At the time I felt that our hands were tied,” but “we have to give President Johnson credit for not allowing the war to expand geographically [emphasis in original].” Certainly Vietnam taught us how immensely difficult it is to fight limited wars leading to U.S. casualties over long periods of time. But circumstances will arise where limited war is far preferable to unlimited war. Before engaging in such conflicts, the American people must understand the difficulties we will face; the American military must know and accept the constraints under which they will operate; and our leaders—and our people—must be prepared to cut our losses and withdraw if it appears our limited objectives cannot be achieved at acceptable risks or costs.

We must learn from Vietnam how to manage limited wars effec-
tively. A major cause of the debacle there lay in our failure to establish an organization of top civilian and military officials capable of directing the task. Over and over again, as my story of the decision-making process makes shockingly clear, we failed to address fundamental issues; our failure to identify them was not recognized; and deep-seated disagreements among the president's advisers about how to proceed were neither surfaced nor resolved.

As I have suggested, this resulted in part from our failure to organize properly. No senior person in Washington dealt solely with Vietnam. With the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the national security adviser, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and their associates dividing their attention over a host of complex and demanding issues, some of our shortcomings—in particular, our failure to debate systematically the most fundamental issues—could have been predicted. To avoid these, we should have established a full-time team at the highest level—which Churchill called a War Cabinet—focused on Vietnam and nothing else. At a minimum, it should have included deputies of the secretaries of state and defense, the national security adviser, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the CIA director. It should have met weekly with the president at prescribed times for long, uninterrupted discussions. The weekly meetings should have been expanded monthly to include the U.S. ambassador and U.S. military commander in Vietnam. The meetings should have been characterized by the openness and candor of Executive Committee deliberations during the Cuban Missile Crisis—which contributed to the avoidance of a catastrophe. Similar organizational arrangements should be established to direct all future military operations.

Finally, we must recognize that the consequences of large-scale military operations—particularly in this age of highly sophisticated and destructive weapons—are inherently difficult to predict and to control. Therefore, they must be avoided, excepting only when our nation’s security is clearly and directly threatened. These are the lessons of Vietnam. Pray God we learn them.

I want to add a final word on Vietnam.

Let me be simple and direct—I want to be clearly understood: the United States of America fought in Vietnam for eight years for what it believed to be good and honest reasons. By such action, administrations of both parties sought to protect our security, prevent the spread of totalitarian Communism, and promote individual freedom and political democracy. The Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations made their decisions and by those decisions demanded sacrifices and, yes, inflicted terrible suffering in light of those goals and values.

Their hindsight was better than their foresight. The adage echoes down the corridors of time, applying to many individuals, in many situations, in many ages. People are human; they are fallible. I concede with painful candor and a heavy heart that the adage applies to me and to my generation of American leadership regarding Vietnam. Although we sought to do the right thing—and believed we were doing the right thing—in my judgment, hindsight proves us wrong. We both overestimated the effect of South Vietnam’s loss on the security of the West and failed to adhere to the fundamental principle that, in the final analysis, if the South Vietnamese were to be saved, they had to win the war themselves. Straying from this central truth, we built a progressively more massive effort on an inherently unstable foundation. External military force cannot substitute for the political order and stability that must be forged by people for themselves.

In the end, we must confront the fate of those Americans who served in Vietnam and never returned. Does the unwisdom of our intervention nullify their effort and their loss? I think not. They did not make the decisions. They answered their nation’s call to service. They went in harm’s way on its behalf. And they gave their lives for their country and its ideals. That our effort in Vietnam proved unwise does not make their sacrifice less noble. It endures for all to see. Let us learn from their sacrifice and, by doing so, validate and honor it.

As I end this book, I am reminded of lines from Rudyard
Kipling's poem "The Palace." I first read it nearly sixty years ago. Kipling's words have assumed greater meaning over my lifetime. Today they are haunting.

When I was a King and a Mason—a Master proven and skilled—
I cleared me ground for a Palace such as a King should build.
I decreed and dug down to my levels. Presently, under the silt,
I came on the wreck of a Palace such as a King had built.

There was no worth in the fashion—there was no wit in the plan—
Hither and thither, aimless, the ruined footings ran—
Masonry, brute, mishandled, but carven on every stone:
"After me cometh a Builder. Tell him, I too have known."

Swift to my use in my trenches, where my well-planned groundworks grew;
I tumbled his quoins and his ashlars, and cut and reset them anew.
Lime I milled of his marbles; burned it, stacked it, and spread;
Taking and leaving at pleasure the gifts of the humble dead.

Yet I despised not nor gloried; yet, as we wrenched them apart,
I read in the razed foundations the heart of that builder's heart.
As he had risen and pleaded, so did I understand
The form of the dream he had followed in the face of the thing he had planned.

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When I was a King and a Mason—in the open noon of my pride,
They sent me a Word from the Darkness. They whispered and called me aside.
They said—"The end is forbidden." They said—"Thy use is fulfilled.
"Thy Palace shall stand as that other's—the spoil of a King who shall build."

I called my men from my trenches, my quarries, my wharves, and my sheers.
All I had wrought I abandoned to the faith of the faithless years.
Only I cut on the timber—only I carved on the stone:
"After me cometh a Builder. Tell him, I too have known!"

Each human being lives with unrealized dreams and unfulfilled objectives. Certainly I have. But now, as a century of bloody conflict comes to a close, we have an opportunity to view the future with new hope: The Cold War has ended. We have the lessons of Vietnam before us—they can be learned and applied. We should see more clearly the dangers of a world armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, and we can take steps to avoid nuclear catastrophe. We have a better understanding of the potential—and limitations—of multilateral institutions for minimizing and alleviating disputes within and among nations. Do we not have reason, therefore, to believe that the twenty-first century, while not a century of tranquility, need not witness the killing of another 160 million people by war? Surely that must be not only our hope, not only our dream, but our steadfast objective. Some may consider such a statement so naive, so simplistic, and so idealistic as to be quixotic. But as human beings, citizens of a great nation with the power to influence events in the world, can we be at peace with ourselves if we strive for less?